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ABSTRACT 
This study aims to empirically examine the effects of firms’ size, firms’ risk, and auditors’ 
reputations on tenure in an artificial rotation. The phenomenon of artificial auditor (audit firm) 
rotations in Indonesia is an interesting topic, deserving further study. Artificial auditor rotations 
indicate a condition in which, conceptually, there has been a change of auditor that makes the 
relationship between the auditor and the client end, but in effect, the relationship is still going on. 
Regulations for mandatory auditor rotations causes audit firms or their partners to cheat the system 
by changing the name of their firm, or partners, to allow them to continue auditing the same client. 
This research samples 110 companies listed on the Indonesian Stock Exchange between 2000 and 
2010, which were obtained using a purposive sampling method. The results of a statistical test 
indicate that a company’s size significantly influences the tenure. The variables of firms’ risk and 
auditors’ reputations do not have significant effects on tenure, statistically. This research is expected 
to contribute both theoretically and practically, especially to the regulations on auditors’ rotations. 
Auditing quality is an important factor that must be maintained by the auditor profession, to maintain 
the independence of auditors. In the auditing practices in Indonesia, regulators should consider the 
artificial rotation phenomenon that occurs in Indonesia, so the practice of auditing can run better. 
Keywords: tenure, rotation, size, reputation, quality, risk. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
There are pros and cons about the research 
that challenges whether or not rules for 
mandatory auditor rotations are necessary. Those 
who do not agree with the mandatory rotation of 
auditors consider that the longer the tenure is, 
the more competent the auditors become, since 
they understand their client's conditions better, 
so that they can perform their auditing work 
properly (Geiger & Raghunandan, 2002; Myers 
et al., 2003; Carcello & Nagy, 2004; Ghosh & 
Moon, 2005). Conversely, those supporting the 
mandatory rotation of auditors consider that the 
longer the tenure is, the greater is the possibility 
of diminishing the independence of the audit, 
due to the excessive familiarity between the 
auditor and their client (Mautz & Sharaf, 1961; 
Jackson et al., 2008; Carey & Simnett, 2006; 
Junaidi & Hartono, 2010; Junaidi et al., 2012). 
The tenure shows the length of the relationship 
between the auditor and client. 
Regulations on auditors’ tenure in Indonesia 
have changed several times, namely from the 
Ministry of Finance Decree No. 423/KMK.06/ 
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2002, KMK No. 359/KMK.06/2003, PMK No. 
17 of 2008 to the published Law No. 5 of 2011, 
and Government Regulation No. 20 of 2015 on 
Public Accounting Practices. This suggests that 
the regulator is watching the auditing profession, 
in order to maintain the professionalism of the 
auditors. This research was motivated by the 
phenomenon of the artificial rotation of auditors 
in Indonesia, prior to Government Regulation 
No. 20 of 2015 on Public Accounting Practices 
being issued. There has not been much research 
done in Indonesia that reveals the phenomenon 
of the artificial rotation of auditors. The artificial 
rotation of an auditor is a condition in which, 
conceptually, there has been a change of auditor, 
ending the relationship between the auditor and 
the client, but in fact the relationship is still 
ongoing (Junaidi et al., 2012, 2014; Junaidi, 
2014). It means the regulation on mandatory 
auditor rotation does not end the relationship 
between auditor and client; the phenomenon of 
artificial rotation ensures that the tenure between 
the auditor and the client continues. 
This study aims to empirically examine the 
effect of firms’ size, risks, and auditors’ repu-
tations on tenure. In practice, the regulations on 
tenure have not been empirically proven to be 
effective, because of the phenomenon of 
artificial rotation. Therefore, it is very important 
to uncover what causes the length of tenure, 
because according to DeAngelo (1981); Mansi et 
al. (2004); Mai et al. (2008) and Junaidi et al. 
(2012), a long tenure can reduce an audit’s 
quality (independence). 
The quality of the audits conducted by public 
accountants can be judged from the size of the 
audit firm conducting the auditing processes 
(DeAngelo, 1981b). The large audit firms supply 
higher quality audits because they possess a 
comparative advantage in monitoring individual 
auditor behavior. Big-four auditors are regarded 
as being more qualified to conduct the auditing 
process than the non-big-four auditors. This is 
because the big-four auditors have more clients 
and resources than the smaller ones, so they do 
not have to depend on a particular client. In 
addition, since the big-four auditors are consi-
dered to have good reputations by the public, it 
is believed that they will conduct their audits 
more carefully. However, the accounting 
scandals such as Enron, that involved the audit 
firm of Arthur Andersen made the public 
question the quality of the audits conducted by 
auditors, especially the big-four auditors. 
Therefore, the important matter relating to tenure 
is independence. Independence can be reduced 
due to the emotional relationship between the 
auditor and the client in a long tenure (Nasser et 
al., 2006).  
From the clients’ perspectives, the com-
plexity of financial statements will make them 
appoint auditors with good reputations. While 
from the auditors’ perspective, large companies 
have highly complex accounts, so there is the 
potential for the audit firm to make large sums of 
money. This will certainly encourage the 
auditors to maintain links and relationships with 
their big clients. Also from the clients’ pers-
pective, the company’s risk can affect the quality 
of the auditing. Company risk is often associated 
with the company’s financial condition. The 
financial condition demonstrates the soundness 
of the company in real terms. In companies that 
are experiencing financial difficulties, many 
going concern indicator problems can be found 
(Ramadhany, 2004). Companies that are 
experiencing financial difficulties are willing to 
be audited by the same auditor, since the auditor 
has a greater understanding of the company’s 
condition. In addition, each industry has its own 
separate and different accounting issues, so that 
the auditing needs of each industry are also 
different. Industrial specialization can be 
developed by an auditor, by increasing their 
expertise in a particular industry, or by choosing 
a market that is focused on a particular type of 
industry (Craswell et al., 1995). 
The results of this study are expected to 
contribute both in theory and in practice. In 
theory the results of this study may support the 
concept of independence, that ethically an 
auditor should continue to maintain his/her 
professionalism. The auditor’s interest in the 
income received from their clients should not 
undermine their independence. For the 
regulators, the results of this study support that 
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tenure should remain regulated. It appears that, 
to date, tenure continues to be governed by the 
Government of Indonesia through Government 
Regulation No. 20 of 2015 on Public Accounting 
Practices. 
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 
Independence 
Independence means that an auditor must not 
easily be influenced, and is impartial. Auditors 
are obliged to be honest, not only with the 
management and owners of the company they 
audit, but also with the creditors and other 
parties that trust them to do their duty as public 
accountants (Christiawan, 2002). Auditors 
should have an independent attitude both in 
reality and in performance. Independence in 
reality exists when a public accountant manages 
to maintain an unbiased manner during an audit, 
while independence in their performance is the 
result of other people’s perceptions of the 
independence of public accountants (Maria & 
Pinnarwan, 2003). 
Auditing Standards Section 220 states that in 
all matters relating to the engagement, an 
independent mental attitude must be maintained 
by the auditor. Those standards require auditors 
to be independent, and not easily influenced, 
because they carry out work in the public’s 
interest. People’s trust in auditors’ independence 
is very important for the development of the 
public accounting profession. 
Auditing Quality 
Auditing quality is defined as the possibility 
that the auditor will detect and report material 
misstatements (DeAngelo, 1981b). The reporting 
process conducted by an auditor depends on the 
auditor’s ability to disclose such breaches. An 
auditor can produce good quality audited 
statements if the auditor does his/her duties 
professionally (Nurchasanah & Rahmawati, 
2003). The term ‘auditing quality’ has different 
meanings depending on the viewpoint of the 
recipient or the provider of the audit service. 
Users of financial statements state that good 
quality auditing occurs when the auditor can 
give assurances that there are no material 
misstatements in the financial statement. While 
the auditors’ views are that high quality auditing 
occurs when the auditors work in accordance 
with the existing professional standards, are able 
to assess the audited businesses’ risks with the 
aim of minimizing the risk of litigation, and to 
avoid to the ruin of the auditors’ reputations. 
Therefore, auditing quality is an important thing 
for an auditor during the auditing process. 
To be able to perform their obligations, there 
are three components that must be possessed by 
auditors, namely competence, independence and 
due professional care. In carrying out their 
functions, an auditor often experiences conflicts 
of interest with the company management. The 
management might want the company's 
operating results, or its performance, to appear to 
be more successful by depicting them using 
better data, with the intention of getting an 
award (e.g. bonus). To achieve these objectives, 
the company’s management often compels the 
auditor to produce audited financial statements 
in accordance with their wishes. An auditor has a 
strategic position for both the management and 
the financial statement’s users. Besides, the 
users of financial statements put a lot of faith in 
the work of auditors. This faith in the audited 
financial statements, by their users and in the 
service that is provided by the auditors, requires 
that the auditors pay attention to the quality of 
the auditing they conduct. 
To carry out their professional duties, the 
auditors should be guided by the code of ethics 
for accountants, and the professional and 
accounting standards applicable in Indonesia. 
Auditors must consider their integrity and 
objectivity when carrying out their duties, by 
acting honestly and decisively, without 
pretension, so that they can act fairly and not be 
influenced by certain parties to fulfill those 
parties’ personal interests (Khomsiyah & 
Indriantoro, 1998). 
Deis and Giroux (1992) conducted a study of 
four aspects that are considered to have a 
relationship with an audit’s quality, namely: (1) 
Tenure, implying that the longer an auditor 
works for the same client, the lower the quality 
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of his/her audits become, (2) number of clients, 
hinting at the idea that the greater the number of 
clients an auditor has, the better the auditing 
quality will be, since an auditor with a large 
number of clients will try to maintain his/her 
good reputation, (3) the financial health of the 
client, meaning that the healthier the financial 
condition of the client is, the bigger the tendency 
will be to press the auditor to not follow the 
standard procedures and (4) a review by a third 
party, implying that the quality of the audit will 
increase if the auditor knows that his/her service 
is going to be reviewed by someone else. 
The Firms’ Size 
The size of a company can be measured by 
the total assets of the company. Big companies 
require very complex audits. Therefore, the 
potential revenue to be received by an auditor 
during these audits is also great. Dhaliwal et al. 
(2008) examined the relationship between non-
audit fees, audit fees and auditing quality. They 
found that audit fees have a significant effect on 
the quality of the auditing. Hartadi (2009) found 
evidence that income significantly affects the 
quality of auditing. Francis and Yu (2009) argue 
that a firm’s size will significantly affect the 
quality of its auditing, which in this case is 
associated with the amount of potential revenue 
to be made by the public accounting firms. The 
larger the company’s size is, measured by its 
total assets, the greater are the potential revenues 
to be earned from this company, so that auditors 
are willing to audit the company for a long 
period. If the auditor no longer audits the 
company, the auditor will lose a significant part 
of his/her income, which would affect the total 
revenue received. Suparlan and Andayani 
(2010), in their study mentioned that firms’ size 
negatively affects the change of the auditor, the 
smaller the company the less expensive the fee 
of the auditor is, but the bigger the desire is to 
change the auditor. From the above description 
the author formulates the following research 
hypothesis. 
H01: Firms’ size has no effect on tenure. 
The Firms’ Risk 
The previous studies’ results suggest that 
company risk influences the change of the 
auditor, but they were not all conclusive. 
Sinason et al. (2001); Setyorini and Ardiati 
(2006); Prastiwi and Wilsya (2009) stated that a 
company’s financial problems do not affect 
changing the auditor. While a company that is 
experiencing financial difficulties tends to 
change its auditor more frequently than a healthy 
company [Schwartz & Menon, 1985; Nasser et 
al., 2005; Hudaib & Cooke, 2005]. 
Company risk is seen from the company's 
financial condition. This financial condition is 
very likely to be a factor in the process of 
changing auditors. Francis and Wilson (1988) 
stated that companies with high debt ratios 
which are financially unhealthy tend to use 
auditors with high independence levels, to 
enhance their shareholders and creditors’ confi-
dence in the companies, to reduce any risk of 
litigation. 
According to Chow and Rice (1982), the 
issue of a qualification report is a significant 
reason for a client to change their auditor. 
Schwartz and Menon (1985) found that the 
failure of the client creates a greater tendency for 
them to change their auditor. A company in 
financial difficulties has a greater incentive to 
change its auditor, rather than the company that 
stays healthy, as the managers of the healthy 
company attempt to project a good image of 
their company 
However, auditor rotation is not always 
initiated by the client, but can be started by the 
auditor. Shu (2000) also found that the 
resignation of an auditor is positively associated 
with their client’s legal exposure. Previous 
arguments show that, as a result of the client 
replacing the auditor, or the auditor resigning, 
the auditor will not issue a going concern 
auditing opinion for companies in a good 
financial condition (Ramadhany, 2004). Com-
panies that are experiencing financial difficulties 
want to be audited by the same auditor, because 
that auditor has a better understanding of their 
financial conditions. 
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The company’s risk is measured by Altman’s 
Z score 1968. Ramadhany (2004) stated that the 
financial condition variable, which is calculated 
by Altman’s Z score discriminant analysis, 
negatively affects the possibility of receiving a 
going concern opinion. This finding is supported 
by Santosa and Wedari (2007) who state that the 
better the financial condition of the company is, 
the less likely the auditor will be to give a going 
concern auditing opinion, because the auditor 
will only provide this opinion if the company is 
said to be insolvent or is struggling to continue 
in business. 
Schwartz and Menon (1985); Nasser et al. 
(2006) found that companies that are 
experiencing financial problems will tend to 
change auditors, as compared to healthy 
companies. While Prastiwi and Wilsya (2009) 
stated that the company's financial problems did 
not affect the change of auditor. This study was 
supported by research conducted by Sinason et 
al. (2001); Setyorini and Ardiati (2006) which 
stated that the financial condition does not affect 
the change of auditor. Companies experiencing 
financial distress want to be audited by the same 
auditor, and keep them on longer tenures, 
because these auditors understand the financial 
conditions of the companies. From the above 
discussion, we propose the following research 
hypothesis. 
H02: The firms’ risk has no effect on tenure 
The Auditors’ Reputation 
Auditors are classified into two different 
groups, namely auditors who are affiliated with 
the big four firms and auditors who are not 
affiliated with the big four. When an auditor 
claims to be an auditor of good standing, 
because he/she has connections to the big four, 
he/she will strive to maintain his/her good name 
and avoid actions that lower his/her standing 
(Fanny & Saputra, 2005). After the Enron case, 
the international, world-wide audit companies 
shrank down to only four companies, known as 
the big four auditors. Big Four auditors affiliated 
with local firms in Indonesia include: 
1. Auditing Firm of Purwantono, Sarwoko and 
Sandjaja affiliated with Ernest and Young 
(EY). 
2. Auditing Firm of Osman Bing Satrio and 
Partners affiliated with Deloitte Touche 
Tohmatsu (Deloitte). 
3. Auditing Firm of Siddharta and Widjaja 
affiliated with Klynveld Peat Marwick 
Goerdeler (KPMG). 
4. Auditing Firm of Haryanto Sahari and 
Partners affiliated with Pricewaterhouse 
Coopers (PwC). 
According to the rules of the Indonesian 
Institute of Certified Public Accountants, foreign 
auditors are allowed to perform service activities 
in Indonesia by affiliating with local auditors. 
For that, the measurement of the auditor’s 
reputation is separated into two, namely auditors 
affiliated with the big four and those not affiliat-
ed with the big four. Auditors are responsible for 
providing high quality information that is useful 
for making decisions. Auditors of good standing 
will likely issue a going concern audit opinion, if 
their client’s firm has problems related to it 
being a going concern (Junaidi & Hartono, 
2010). Going concern audit opinion is opinion 
issued by auditors to ascertain whether the 
company can maintain its existence. 
An auditor’s reputation reflects his/her 
achievements, and the trust that he/she is held in 
by the public. Fanny and Saputra (2005) state 
that the client usually perceives that accountants 
coming from the large firms of auditors, who 
have affiliations with international auditors, are 
of a higher quality because the auditors have 
characteristics that can be associated with 
quality, such as training, international recog-
nition and experience, as well as their peer’s 
respect. Auditors who have a good reputation 
and name can provide a better quality of audit, 
including exposing any going concern problems, 
in order to maintain their reputation. Choi et al. 
(2010) found a significant effect of the size of 
the public accounting firms on auditing’s 
quality. Big four auditors provide a higher 
quality than the smaller or non-reputable 
auditors do. Small auditors are more likely to 
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depend on a specific client, compared to the big 
auditors. 
Ghosh and Moon (2005) showed that an 
audit’s quality improves with the increase of 
tenure. Sinason et al. (2001) and Nasser (2006) 
found empirical evidence that the type of auditor 
significantly affects the auditor’s length of 
employment and possibility of being replaced. 
These results are consistent with the stake-
holders’ image that the big four auditors provide 
a better service and performance than the non-
big four auditors. Therefore, companies that 
have cooperated with the big four have the 
possibility of extending their tenure, compared 
to companies that work with non-big four 
auditors. The determining of which auditors get 
into the big four is conducted based on the 
performance of the auditors concerned, and it 
has been proven empirically that the big four 
auditors give more satisfaction than the non-big 
four, so that the possibility of firms replacing 
their auditors becomes lower. From the above 
description, we propose the following research 
hypothesis. 
H03:  Auditors’ reputation has no effect on 
tenure. 
Tenure and Auditors’ Rotation Rules 
Auditor rotation regulations in Indonesia 
have experienced several changes. To maintain 
the auditors’ quality, the Indonesian Government 
has issued the Decree of the Minister of Finance 
No. 423/KMK.06/2002, which was renewed by 
the Decree of the Minister of Finance No. 
359/KMK.06/2003. This regulation stated that 
the longest permissible time for the provision of 
public services for a client's financial statements, 
conducted by a audit firm, is five consecutive 
fiscal years and by a partner, the longest time is 
for three consecutive fiscal years. Further, the 
regulation is re-updated by the Minister of 
Finance Regulation No. 17, 2008. The second 
part of the regulation describes the time 
limitation of the provision of services by an 
auditor, in this case the services provision for the 
general auditing of a financial statement of an 
entity, is referred to by Article 2 Paragraph (1) 
letter a, which states that this can be conducted 
by auditors for no more than six consecutive 
fiscal years, and by a public accountant for no 
more than three consecutive fiscal years. On the 
6th of April 2015, the government issued 
Government Regulation No. 20 of 2015 on 
Public Accounting Practices which is a further 
re-arrangement of Act No. 5 of 2011 on Public 
Accountants. In connection with the public 
accounting firms’ rotation rules set forth in 
Article 11 of the Regulation 20/2015, which in 
Article 11 paragraph (1) explains that: “The 
provision of auditing services on historical 
financial information referred to in Article 10 
Paragraph (1) letter a, to an entity by a public 
accountant is limited to no more than five 
consecutive years.” 
The phenomenon of the artificial rotation of 
auditors in Indonesia would be an interesting 
problem to be investigated, considering whether 
the length of tenure is in order to improve the 
auditing quality or it is only because the auditor 
does not want to lose clients, and income. 
Tenure is a period of engagement between the 
auditor and client, related to the agreed provision 
of auditing services, or it can also be interpreted 
as a term for the relationship between an auditor 
and client. There are a number of studies linking 
quality with auditing assignment periods. 
According to DeAngelo (1981a), with the long 
time span and auditing assignment sustainability, 
the auditing services’ users (such as share-
holders, bondholders, managers, employees, 
government agencies and others) will benefit 
because they can save the costs associated with 
the evaluation of their audit’s quality. Although 
DeAngelo (1981a) did not explicitly state that an 
audit’s quality is correlated to a specific period 
of time as the optimum time for the assignment 
of an auditor, he did argue that various benefits 
will be lost if the auditor’s assignment period is 
only for a short time period. 
There is an argument supporting the 
existence of a negative relationship between the 
duration of an auditor’s assignment and the 
quality of the audits. Mautz and Sharaf (1961) 
state that the auditors should be aware of various 
conditions that can affect their behavior, and 
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may also reduce their independence. For 
example, the longer the relationship lasts 
between an auditor and client, this can have an 
adverse effect on the independence of the 
auditor, as his/her objectivity of the client will be 
reduced over time (Deis and Giroux, 1992). 
Types of Industries 
Each industry has different characteristics. 
The client's business operations and risks vary 
by their industry type (Lim et al., 2010). 
Research shows that the nature and incidence of 
errors in financial statements vary by industry 
(Maletta & Wright, 1996). With a long tenure, 
an auditor has a better understanding of his/her 
clients and their industries, which implies that 
the auditor will develop a reputation for 
conducting better audits of his/her clients. 
The Research’s Framework 
In this study, the dependent variable is 
tenure. The independent variables are the 
company’s size, the company's risk and the 
auditor's reputation, while the type of industry is 
the control variable. 
 
Figure 1. Research’s Framework 
RESEARCH METHOD 
Sample 
The sample used in this study is all the 
companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange in the period 2000-2010. Allegedly, 
during that period, many artificial rotation 
phenomena occured, because the mandatory 
rotation of auditors was established in 2002, 
revised in 2003, and then again in 2008. The 
sampling method used was purposive sampling 
with the following criteria: 
1. Companies listed on the Indonesian Stock 
Exchange, other than banks, in the period 
from 2000 to 2010. 
2. Companies that published complete annual 
financial statements in the period from 2000 
to 2010. 
3. Companies in which the artificial rotation of 
auditors has allegedly occurred. 
Reasearch Data  
The required data are as follows: Auditor’s 
name, partner's name, the name of the auditor’s 
affiliate and the audited financial statements 
from 2000 to 2010, to determine the tenure. In 
addition, data about the balance sheets, income 
statements and cash flow statements of 
companies that have been audited from 2000 to 
2010 are required. 
The Operational Definition of the Variable 
The Firms’ Size 
The firms’ size variable was measured by 
using the client’s natural log of total assets. The 
total size of the assets is used because the larger 
the total assets owned are, the bigger the 
potential revenue and non-attestation services 
provided to the auditors will be. Big potential 
revenues would encourage auditors not to lose 
the client, so that the tenure continues. 
The Firms’ Risk  
Company risk variables are assessed using 
Altman’s Z score. This study is using Altman 
(1968) so that banking companies are excluded 
from the sample. Once the value of the Z score is 
known, then the ordinal data of Altman’s Z score 
formula are made, as follows: 
ܼ = 0.717	 ଵܺ + 	0.847ܺଶ +	  
        3.107ܺଷ + 	0.420ܺସ + 	0.998ܺହ   (1) 
Notation: 
X1 = working capital/total assets 
X2 = retained earnings/total assets 
  
 
   
Firm Size
Firm Risk 
Auditor Reputation 
Tenure 
Type of Industry
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X3 = EBIT/total debt 
X4 = market value of equity/total assets 
X5 = Sales/total assets 
If the Z value is above 2.9, the company is 
classified as a non-distress company, and is rated 
3. If the Z value is between 1.2 and 2.9, the 
company's condition is included in the grey area, 
and is rated 2. While if the Z value is below 1.2, 
the company is classified as a distress company 
and is rated 1. 
Auditors’ Reputation 
The auditor’s reputation is measured by 
using dummy variables. An auditor’s reputation 
is classified into two groups, namely the auditor 
affiliated with the big four auditor firms (value 
of 1) and the auditor affiliated with a non-big 
four firm (value of 0). 
Tenure 
Tenure indicates the period of assignment to 
audit a firm’s books, which implies the length of 
the relationship between the auditor and client. 
Tenure is measured by the number of years 
during the period of observation. 
Type of Industry 
Type of Industry shows the characteristics of 
each industry type. According to the Indonesian 
Stock Exchange, industries can be divided into 
nine categories, namely: 
1. Agriculture 
2. Mining 
3. Basic Industries and Chemicals 
4. Miscellaneous Industries 
5. Customer Goods Industry 
6. Property, Real Estate and Building 
Construction 
7. Infrastructure, Utilities and Transportation 
8. Finance 
9. Trade, Services and Investment 
Test of Statistics 
Descriptive Statistics and Classic Assumption 
Testing 
Descriptive statistics provide a description of 
data that can be seen from the mean value, 
standard deviation, maximum and minimum. 
Classic assumption testing includes multi-
collinearity, autocorrelation, and heteros-
cedasticity. 
Hypotheses Testing 
The regression model used in this research 
is: 
TENURE =	∝ +β1SIZE +β2RISK + 
   β3REP +β4INDUSTRY +ε (2) 
Notation: 
TENURE = length of auditor-client relationships 
that is measured by the number of 
years 
SIZE  =  company’s size using the logarithm of 
the total assets of the client’s company. 
RISK =  company's risk is measured using 
Altman’s Z score. 
REP  =  auditor’s reputation is calculated using 
the dummy variables. If the company 
is audited by an auditor who is 
affiliated with the big four firms it will 
be given 1, and non-big four will be 
given 0. 
INDUSTRY = a control variable that indicates 
the type of the client’s industry 
α = constant. 
β1, β2, β3, β4 = regression coefficients. 
ε = error. 
Hypotheses testing used multiple linear 
regression analysis with a significance level (α) 
of 0.05. If the p-value is less than 0.05, H0 will 
be rejected. 
THE RESEARCH ANALYSIS  
Data Description 
Based on the sampling criteria, the sample 
data in Table 1 are obtained, as follows. 
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Table 1. Sample Data 
Description Amount 
Companies registered in 2000-2010 
Financial industry (banking) 
293 
(25) 
Other than financial industry (banking) 
Incomplete financial statements  
Audited company and allegedly artificial rotation did not occur 
268 
(77) 
(81) 
Audited company and allegedly artificial rotation occurred 110 
 
The samples distribution, based on the auditor-
client relationship, is shown in Table 2. From 
Table 2 it is seen that 14 companies were audited 
by the same auditor for six consecutive years, 22 
companies for seven consecutive years, 23 
companies for eight consecutive years, 29 
companies for nine consecutive years, 8 
companies for over ten consecutive years, while 
14 companies were audited for 11 consecutive 
years. 
Table 2. Tenure Distribution 
Tenure Amount Percentage 
6 consecutive years 14 12.73 percent 
7 consecutive years 22 20.00 percent 
8 consecutive years 23 20.91 percent 
9 consecutive years 29 26.36 percent 
10 consecutive years 8 7.27 percent 
11 consecutive years 14 12.73 percent 
An auditor’s reputation is categorized as an 
auditor who is affiliated either with a big four 
firm or not. The majority of companies sampled 
in this study are companies audited by auditors 
who are affiliated with the big four firms, 
amounting to 75.25 percent of the total sample. 
Table 3. Auditors’ Distribution 
Auditor Percentage 
Affiliated with big four 75.25 percent 
Not affiliated with big four 24.75 percent 
 100 percent 
Descriptive Statistics  
This study focuses on tenure as the 
dependent variable, and the size of the company, 
the risk to the company and the auditor's 
reputation as the independent variables, while 
the type of industry served as the control 
variable. The following is a statistical descrip-
tion of each variable.   
Table 4. Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Minimum Maximum Mean 
LSIZE 10 18 13.78 
RISK 1 3 2.15 
REP 0 1  
TENURE 1 11 4.79 
INDUSTRY 0 1  
Table 4 shows that the minimum size value 
is 10, the maximum value is 18 and the mean is 
13.78. The minimum value of company's risk is 
1, the maximum value is 3, and the mean is 2.15. 
While the minimum value for tenure is 1, the 
maximum value is 11 and the mean is 4.79. 
Classic Assumption Testing Results 
Classic assumption testing results show that 
the model has fulfilled all the classical 
assumptions of multicollinearity, autocorrelation 
and heteroscedasticity, as required by the 
multiple linear regression method1.  
Hypotheses Testing Results 
The regression results (Table 5) show an 
adjusted value R2 of 0.024, and a significant 
model with a p-value of 0.00. This means that 
only 2.4 percent of tenure, as the dependent 
variable, is explained by firms’ size, firms’ risk, 
auditors’ reputation, or industry variables, while 
                                                            
1 Statistical testing for classical assumptions indicating VIF 
values less than 10 means that multicolinearity does not 
occur. Further tests further indicate that the value of 
Durbin Waston (DW) is 1.09 so there is no 
autocorrelation, and Glejser test results show that none of 
the independent variables are statistically significant, so 
heteroscedastisity does not occur. 
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the rest (97.6 percent) is explained by other 
factors outside the model. Furthermore, it is 
shown that the model with a dependent variable 
of tenure, and independent variables of size, risk, 
auditors’ reputation and industry variables is 
considered proper, with a significance level from 
ANOVA models of 0.00. The results of the 
regression testing appear in Table 5. 
Table 5. Regression Testing 
Variables B P-Value 
CONSTANT 1.237 0.141 
LSIZE 0.277 0.000 
RISK -0.147 0.195 
REP 0.027 0.902 
INDUSTRY 0.009 0.821 
The size variable has a positive coefficient of 
0.277 and a significance value of 0.000, which is 
below 0.05. Because the significance level is 
smaller than α = 0.05, H01 is rejected. This 
study statistically demonstrates empirical 
evidence that the size of a company has a 
significant effect on tenure. These results 
suggest that the bigger companies, that are 
proxied by total assets, push for longer 
relationships with their auditors. The larger the 
size of the company is, the greater is the 
potential revenue provided by the client to the 
auditor. Therefore the auditor does not want to 
lose this potential revenue, and also seeks a long 
tenure. This is in line with research conducted by 
Suparlan and Andayani (2010) where the size of 
the company is associated with its changes of 
auditor. The research result states that big 
companies very rarely make their auditor’s 
change, most clients change auditor after being 
audited by the same auditor for five consecutive 
years. Therefore, it is very possible that the 
auditor also wants a long relationship with the 
client. The implication is that, because of the 
great revenue potential from large companies, 
the auditor may not maintain his/her indepen-
dence. 
The firms’ risk variable has negative 
coefficients and is insignificant. Because the 
significance value is 0.195 (above 0.05), then 
H02 cannot be rejected. Therefore firms’ risk 
does not affect the tenure. From the research 
sample it is seen that 23.33 percent of the 
companies are listed as being non-distress 
companies, while 38.50 percent of companies 
are classed as being in the grey areas, and 38.17 
percent of companies are considered to be in 
distress. This means that companies experienc-
ing financial distress will continue to replace 
their auditors. This is most likely because the 
auditors failed to detect significant weaknesses 
in the company’s internal controls. The results 
are consistent with the research conducted by 
Schwartz and Menon (1985); Nasser et al. 
(2006) who found that companies experiencing 
financial problems would tend to change 
auditors more frequently, compared to healthy 
companies. So companies with financial 
problems do not want a long relationship with 
their auditors.  
The reputation variable has a negative 
coefficient and is insignificant (p-value = 0.902). 
Since the significance value is above 0.05, H03 
cannot be rejected. Therefore, it can be said that 
an auditor’s reputation does not affect their 
tenure. The samples distribution shows that 
75.25 percent of the sampled companies were 
audited by an auditor who was affiliated with the 
big four firms. Although statistically it is 
insignificant that an auditor’s reputation affects 
their tenure, the sample companies used more 
auditing services provided by auditors from 
firms affiliated with the big four. This is in 
accordance with the image that the stakeholders 
have. It shows that an auditor who is connected 
with the big four firms provides a better quality 
audit than a non-big four auditor. The control 
variable showed that the type of industry shows 
an insignificant result on tenure. However, 
conceptually clients will certainly choose 
auditors who are in accordance with the desired 
specifications of the clients. This will imply that 
auditors can develop their expertise in accor-
dance with the needs of their clients’ industries. 
CONCLUSION 
The issuing of government regulations on 
limitations for auditors’ service provisions to 
clients encourages the phenomenon of artificial 
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rotation. As a rule, if the client has rotated the 
auditor, but the auditor-client relationship is still 
established, as indicated by the length of tenure, 
this breaks the issued regulations Therefore, it is 
important to empirically reveal several factors 
that affect tenure. Statistical testing results show 
that the size of a company significantly affects 
the tenure. Companies' risks statistically do not 
have a significant effect on tenure. Furthermore, 
an auditor’s reputation is also shown not to have 
a significant affect on tenure. The findings imply 
that auditor (partner) relationships need to be 
regulated, to maintain the audit quality as set out 
in the Public Accountants Professional 
Standards. These findings support Government 
Regulation No. 20 of 2015 regarding Public 
Accounting Practices. 
Limitations and Suggestions 
In this study, there are some limitations due 
to the incomplete data that the companies have, 
so that the sample in this research is rather 
limited. This study only used as its sample 
public companies that performed an artificial 
rotation, whereas there are many non-public 
companies which also do this, and need to be 
investigated. This study only uses three 
independent variables: The company’s size, the 
company's risk and the auditor’s reputation, and 
one control variable, the type of industry. 
Further research can add study variables, such as 
culture, to reveal whether the length of tenure is 
also influenced by cultural elements. In addition, 
it is also important to reveal empirically why a 
limit of five years tenure was chosen. 
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